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Torts-PARENTAL IMMUNITY-THE FIRST DISTRICT DECLINES TO
ADOPT THE DOCTRINE OF PARENTAL IMMUNTY-Ard v. Ard, 395 So.
2d 586 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
Twenty years after the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity
was articulated in Florida case law,1 the First District Court of Ap-
peal in a case of first impression in that district has declined to
adopt parental immunity in suits arising from automobile
accidents.
In Ard v. Ard,2 the plaintiff sought compensation for injuries
suffered by Benji Dwain Clary, a minor, when the child's mother
negligently unloaded him from a vehicle and then ran over him.'
Suit was brought on his behalf by his guardian, Douglas Perry Ard,
his mother's husband,4 naming Sylvia Ard and her two liability in-
surance carriers as defendants." The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that such a
suit is barred by the doctrine of parental immunity.6 Plaintiff
moved to amend the complaint to show that this particular suit
would not violate the policy considerations underlying parental im-
munity,7 but the motion was denied; the court did not feel the ad-
ditional allegations would affect the original decision.'
After hearing oral arguments, the First District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court, finding that no mandatory precedent im-
posed parental immunity on the district 9 and that the policy con-
siderations historically cited as rationales for barring such a suit
were inapplicable in the case sub judice.10 The court acknowledged
what has heretofore been considered the leading Florida case im-
posing parental immunity, Orefice v. Albert," but argued that
since the issue of parental immunity was not central to the holding
1. Meehan v. Meehan, 133 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
2. 395 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Plaintiff alleged in the proposed amended complaint that the action would not
disrupt the parent-child relationship; that the uncompensated injury, on the other hand,
would have an adverse effect on the family; that there was no collusion between the parties
to the suit; and that there were witnesses other than the parties who would substantiate
plaintiff's claims. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 587-88.
10. Id. at 588-90.
11. 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970). Ore/ice is the Florida Supreme Court's only pronounce-
ment on interfamilial immunity other than interspousal immunity. It has generally been
cited as controlling precedent. Vinci v. Gensler, 269 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
Withrow v. Woods, 386 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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in Ore/ice, the adoption of parental immunity was dictum.12 The
court also noted that no common law basis exists for the doctrine
of parental immunity and therefore refused to analogize parental
immunity to interspousal immunity.'3 Instead, the court looked to
another judicially created immunity, municipal immunity,"' to sup-
port its rejection of the claim that only legislative action should be
allowed to abrogate parental immunity as applied by other courts
in Florida.15
The dispositive element of this case, however, seemed to be the
lack of valid policy behind parental immunity.'" The court quoted
extensively from the recent opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court,
Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 17 which examined two of the most fre-
quently advanced rationales supporting parental immunity: 1) dis-
ruption of familial peace and harmony and 2) danger of fraud or
collusion.' 8 The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that family harmony
and tranquillity did not require that a minor injured in an automo-
bile accident be denied recovery from his parent.' 9 In support of its
ruling the court listed nineteen jurisdictions which have either
abolished parental immunity altogether or in cases arising out of
automobile accidents, 0 and noted that although the abolition had
occurred as much as sixteen years earlier" "there apparently has
been no significant disruption in family relationships as grimly
predicted by the prophets of doom. ' 22 While admitting that the
12. 395 So. 2d at 587, n.1. Heretofore, where the articulation of parental immunity in
Orefice has been recognized as dictum it has been accorded the greatest possible persuasive
weight. See Horton v. Unigard Ins. Co., 355 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
13. 395 So. 2d at 588.
14. Id.
15. Id. "We can see no necessity for insisting on legislative action in a matter which the
courts themselves originated." 395 So. 2d at 588 (quoting Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,
96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957)).
16. Id.
17. 611 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980). The First District Court of Appeal does no more than
reproduce an abridged version of the Kansas opinion. There is no* original language from the
Florida court pertaining to policy bonsiderations. 395 So. 2d at 588-90.
18. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1030,
1072-73, 1074-76 (1930). See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
Nocktonick, see Note, Personal Injuries: Parental Liability and Automobile Negligence, 20
WASHBURN L.J. 460 (1981).
19. 611 P.2d at 140.
20. The states listed were Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ne-
vada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. 611 P.2d at
141.
21. New Hampshire abolished parental immunity, at least insofar as it relates to auto-
mobile accidents, in 1966. Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966).
22. 611 P.2d at 141.
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possibility of collusion between parent and child exists, the Kansas
Supreme Court noted that judges and juries daily prove themselves
equal to the task of sifting evidence and reaching proper verdicts. 23
The decision in Nocktonick, and therefore presumably the deci-
sion in Ard,24 was expressly limited to cases in which suits between
parents and children arise from automobile accidents.2 5 Nonethe-
less, the Ard holding is contrary to decisions in each of the other
Florida districts.26 On this basis the question was certified to the
Florida Supreme Court, but without the automobile-tort
limitation.27
As noted by the Ard court, there exists no common law basis for
parental tort immunity.28 While there are no cases on record in
which a child actually sued his parents in English common law,2
suits involving property (including torts against property) have al-
ways been allowed between parent and child,30 nor was there any
indication that tort suits would be disallowed.3 1 The doctrine of
parental immunity, rather than arising from time-honored tradi-
tions of the common law, is a ninety-year-old product of judicial
policy-making.3 2 In 1891 the Mississippi Supreme Court an-
nounced the rule of parental immunity in Hewellette v. George."
The court's opinion was grounded firmly in the need to preserve
family harmony:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right
to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
23. Id. at 142.
24. See supra note 17.
25. 611 P.2d at 142.
26. See infra note 70.
27. "The question is certified to the Supreme Court... WHETHER AN UNEMANCI-
PATED MINOR CHILD MAY MAINTAIN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST HIS
PARENT." 395 So. 2d at 590. The case, Supreme Court # 60,475, will be decided without
oral argument.
28. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 122, 864-69 (4th ed. 1971).
29. Id. See Comment, Tort Action Between Members of the Family-Husband &
Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 180 (1961).
30. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 865. McCurdy supra note 18, at 1056-59.
31. Berman, Time to Abolish Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Call to Repudiate Missis-
sippi's Gift to the American Family, 4 NOVA L.J. 25, 27 (1980).
32. Id. at 29.
33. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). The case involved a suit by a daughter for her wrongful im-
prisonment in an insane asylum by the mother. The defendant apparently did not advance a
parental immunity argument. The Mississippi Supreme Court answered the assignments of
error in favor of the daughter/plaintiff but declined to reinstate the original jury verdict in
her favor on the grounds of the newly minted parental immunity doctrine.
1982]
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personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.34
Twelve years later the supreme court of Tennessee heard a case
in which a child sued a parent and a step-parent for tortious con-
duct. The court affirmed the dismissal of the child's case in Mc-
Kelvey v. McKelvey 5 on the grounds of parental immunity, which
the court found to be rooted firmly in the common law, though
citing Hewellette as the only extant case law on the subject. 6
The final case making up the "great trilogy" 7 which imposed
parental immunity on American law was Roller v. Roller.3s The su-
preme court of Washington denied the child a cause of action on
three grounds which have become common buttresses of parental
immunity:3 9 preservation of family harmony,40 preservation of the
family exchequer,4 1 and danger of the tortfeasor reacquiring the
award through inheritance.42 Recognizing the absurdity of claiming
parental immunity as a protector of family harmony in a case
which involved rape of a daughter by her father, the court none-
theless feared that allowing recovery for so heinous a tort would
allow recovery for even those minor torts which arise in normal
domestic relations. An injured child could only look to the criminal
law for protection; he was not entitled to compensation. 3
All three of these cases involved intentional torts. However, be-
cause the immunity doctrine was absolute as enunciated in all
three cases, it has been extended to negligence actions.' 4 Dissatis-
faction with the results of the rule was not long in surfacing, giving
rise to exceptions which weakened the effect of the doctrine with-
out initiating any reconsideration of the fundamental validity of
parental immunity.4 5
34. Id. at 887. The court went on to say that a child's only recourse would be the crimi-
nal laws of the state.
35. 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
36. Id. The court found validation of its assertion of the common law rule in the fact
that "this rule of the common law has never been questioned in any of the courts of this
country, and certainly no such action as the present has been maintained in these courts."
Id.
37. Comment, supra note 29, at 182.
38. 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905). The action was brought by a fifteen-year-old girl whose fa-
ther had been convicted of raping her. She had been awarded $2,000 in damages and sought
to attach the family homestead upon which her minor siblings still resided.
39. McCurdy, supra note 18, at 1072-77.
40. 79 P. at 788.
41. Id. at 789.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1923).
45. Comment, supra note 29, at 194-209. These exceptions have included situations:
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Recently, however, many jurisdictions have shown a willingness
to abrogate the parental immunity doctrine in general while retain-
ing certain exceptions to tort liability."6 The leading case in this
approach has been Goiter v. White47 in which the supreme court of
Wisconsin chose to abrogate parental immunity with two key ex-
ceptions: (1) negligent acts involving exercises of parental author-
ity; (2) negligent acts within the scope of ordinary parental discre-
tion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing,
medical and dental services, and other care." The need to protect
the parents' right to perform their parental duties without judicial
interference is at the heart of these exceptions.
Another approach has been to abrogate parental immunity and
to substitute a specialized standard of care.4" The supreme court of
California chose this path in Gibson v. Gibson,50 holding that the
parent would be judged by the standards of "an ordinarily reason-
able and prudent parent ... in similar circumstances. 5'  New
York has added an interesting gloss on parental duty by receding
from an absolute abrogation of interfamilial immunity for non-
willful torts.5 2 In Holodook v. Spencer"s the court ruled that failure
to adequately supervise a child is not tortious conduct giving rise
to parental liability for resultant injuries."
(i) where the minor child is emancipated,
(ii) where the defendant has liability insurance,
(iii) where the injury arises from parental assumption of some role other than
parent (e.g. employer),
(iv) where the defendant is not the natural parent,
(v) where the child is illegitimate,
(vi) where death has dissolved the family unit,
(vii) where the injury is caused by conduct other than simple negligence.
Note, The Unsupervised Child: Parental Negligence or Necessity? 15 VAL. U.L. REV. 167,
177-81 (1980).
46. Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to Parent-Child
Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLo. L. REV. 795, 804 (1976).
47. 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
48. Id. at 198. On the facts of the case the injury could easily have been brought within
one of the recognized exceptions. See supra note 45. The child, while working for his foster
father, fell from the drawbar of a tractor on which he was riding. The court elected to abol-
ish the general rule.
49. Comment, supra note 46, at 795, 803-04.
50. 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
51. Id. at 293 (emphasis in original). One commentator feels that this standard of care is
too burdensome for parents and would prefer that the courts adopt "reckless disregard of
the child's safety" as the standard for imposing liability. Comment, Negligent Parental Su-
pervision as Grounds for Contribution in Tort: The Case for Minimal Parental Liability,
12 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 828, 843-48 (1979).
52. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
53. 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
54. This ruling has caused the New York courts difficulty in later cases. See Nolechek v.
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The history of parent-child tort immunity in Florida is short. It
was first articulated in Meehan v. Meehan,5 5 an action brought by
a father against a minor son for negligence resulting in the death of
another minor son. The Second District Court of Appeal acknowl-
edged the lack of a common law foundation for the immunity but
held that public policy required that the action be barred.56 The
Second District Court of Appeal also heard the first Florida case in
which a child brought suit against his parents for injuries arising
from their alleged negligence. The suit was brought on behalf of
the injured child by his father and next friend, Cecil Ray Rickard,
against the child's father and mother, Cecil Ray and Elnora Rick-
ard. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action on the grounds that a party is not
able to sue himself. 8 The court of appeal affirmed the decision,
analogizing Rickard to Meehan and stating "[w]e see no reason
why the rule should not be the same where a minor child, acting
through his natural parent, seeks to sue his parents for damages
for their alleged negligence in not properly protecting the person of
the minor child." 5
9
The Fourth District Court of Appeal was sufficiently impressed
by Meehan and Rickard to defer to the Second District's rule in
deciding Denault v. Denault,60 a negligence action rising out of an
automobile accident. In a per curiam opinion distinguished more
for terseness than for analytical insight, the court, after reviewing
the facts, set forth its holding in four sentences:
A great deal has been written, pro and con, on the subject of tort
actions by unemancipated minors against their parents. We doubt
that we can add anything to it. Suffice it to say that the issue has
been previously determined in Florida and we are in nowise per-
suaded that Florida's rule is wrong or that it should be abrogated.
We affirm upon the authority of Meehan v. Meehan [and] Rick-
Gesuale, 396 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1977). A father gave his legally blind son a motorbike and
brought a wrongful death action against the owner of property on which his son was killed
when he struck a chain closing off a gravel road. The court ruled that the father was not
bound to protect his son but was bound to protect third parties from harm arising from the
son's use of a dangerous instrumentality (i.e. the motorbike). The harm to the third party
here was potential liability for the boy's wrongful death.
55. 133 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
56. Id. at 777.
57. Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id.
60. 220 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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ard v. Rickard.6'
The following year the Florida Supreme Court decided Orefice,
in which the court was called upon to determine whether a wife
was barred from bringing suit on her own behalf and that of her
son's estate against the co-owner of the plane in which her hus-
band and son perished as a result of her husband's negligence. 2
Before addressing the liability of the co-owner-defendant, the
court stated:
It is established policy, evidenced by many decisions, that suits
will not be allowed in this state among members of a family unit
for tort. Spouses may not sue each other, nor children their par-
ents. The purpose of this policy is to protect family harmony and
resources .... Thus, the estate or survivor of Michael Betz
would be barred from bringing suit against the estate of his negli-
gent father.0 3
Two years later, Orefice was cited by the Third District Court of
Appeal in a case of first impression in that district as authority for
the proposition that a minor child could not maintain a suit
against his father for negligence. 4 That same year the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, in Vinci v. Gensler,65 affirmed the dismissal
of a suit on behalf of the estates of the minor children against the
estate of their father. The entire family had perished in a plane
crash allegedly caused by the father's negligence. In a one sentence
per curiam opinion the court found it necessary to cite only Orefice
and Webb. However, Judge Liles dissented strongly, attacking both
interspousal and parental immunity on the grounds that both had
outlived their usefulness." He pointed out that any policy to pre-
serve family peace and harmony was absurd in the case before the
court since the family unit had been dissolved in death. He sum-
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
63. Id. at 145. The court apparently considered three cases sufficient to establish the
"policy evidenced by many decisions" in Florida law. The supreme court itself had had an
earlier opportunity to acknowledge the doctrine of parental immunity in Shiver v. Sessions,
80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955). In that case, minor children brought a wrongful death action
against their stepfather's estate after he killed their mother and committed suicide. The
issue before the court was whether the mother's incapacity to sue because of interspousal
immunity would bar the children's action. There was no discussion of any bar arising from
parental immunity.
64. Webb v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
65. 269 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
66. Id. (Liles, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
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marized his position by attacking the policy considerations under-
lying immunity and focusing on the effect of liability insurance:6"
[I]n the society in which we live the greater weight of logic is on
the side of reversing and abrogating the ill-founded doctrine of
interspousal and parental tort immunity. They are supported by
mistaken axioms and ill-founded reasons and in this particular
case even those ill-founded reasons are absent. I further believe
that the courts are capable of distinguishing between a fraudulent
raid on a treasury of an insurance company and legitimate claims
of a wife or child where the benefit of liability protection has been
purchased by the husband and father. I cannot believe that the
father purchased this insurance policy to protect all other wives
and children but not his own.6e
Judge Liles' vigorous dissent notwithstanding, every district ex-
cept the first has adopted or affirmed parental immunity on the
authority of Orefice.10 As one court noted, "Appellant says the
quoted statement from Orefice . . . is obiter dictum and we con-
cede that it is. However, it is obiter dictum from the highest court
in this State and that is no ordinary dictum! 7 1
Since the supreme court's acknowledgement of interfamilial tort
immunity in 1970, tort law in Florida has changed greatly. 2 The
abrogation of the contributory negligence doctrine and substitution
of the doctrine of comparative negligence, 8 the enactment of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), " and the
Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act 5 have caused courts
to reexamine the effects of absolute immunity. Until recently,
where a child recovered a judgment against a third party for an
68. Judge Liles also raises an interesting and unusual constitutional argument, asserting
that such immunity violates the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
and §§ 2, 9, and 21 of the Florida Constitution. "Tort immunity is too imperfect a tool for
the attainment of the laudable goals its advocates espouse to justify denial of these constitu-
tional rights." Id. at 22.
69. Id.
70. Second District: Vinci v. Gensler, 269 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
Third District: Wright v. Farmers' Reliance Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); Webb v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
Fourth District: Horton v. Unigard Ins. Co., 355 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
Fifth District: Withrow v. Woods, 386 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
71. Horton v. Unigard Ins. Co., 355 So. 2d at 155.
72. Berman supra note 31, at 52.
73. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
74. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1981).
75. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1981). This act requires proof of either personal injury
insurance or of financial responsibility by anyone seeking to register a motor vehicle. Its
effect has been to introduce insurance carriers into virtually all automobile tort litigation.
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injury caused by the joint negligence of the parents and the defen-
dant, parental immunity blocked the third party's suit against the
parents for contribution.70 In an interspousal immunity case, Shor
v. Paoli,7 the Florida Supreme Court recognized the potential
windfall such a holding represented. The court ruled that inter-
spousal immunity was not a bar to a claim for contribution under
the UCATA.7 8
The Third District Court of Appeal recently applied the reason-
ing of Shor to parental immunity, ruling in Quest v. Joseph7 9 that
a third party may seek contribution from a negligent parent whose
child he has compensated for injuries. The Third District Court of
Appeal stood firmly behind the doctrine of parental immunity, 0
congratulating itself on avoiding the problems New York courts
have faced as a result of the partial abrogation of parental immu-
nity there.8 Nonetheless, the court acknowledged:
that the result makes Florida the worst of all possible jurisdic-
tions for an injured child. He may not sue his parent directly; and
any action against a negligent third-party may be inhibited or
compromised by the fact that the third-party defendant can....
[It has been suggested] that the rule should be just the opposite,
that is, one which permits neither immunity nor contribution.
Perhaps this state of affairs will lead the supreme court to a mod-
ification of Raisen-Orefice, of Shor-Florida Farm Bureau, or
both.82
76. See, e.g., 3-M Electric Corp. v. Vigoa, 369 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979),
questioned in Quest v. Joseph, 392 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Mieure v.
Moore, 330 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976), overruled in Quest v. Joseph. See infra
notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
77. 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977).
78. Id. at 826. The court accepted the appellate court's reasoning that the purpose of the
immunity was the "preservation of the family unit." A suit between joint tortfeasors was not
a threat to family unity even though the facts of the situation would involve the same par-
ties as an interfamilial suit. This decision was held to invalidate family exclusion clauses in
automobile insurance policies, allowing the negligent family member to shift the loss from
the family exchequer to the insurance carrier. Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1980); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Petrik, 343 So.
2d 48 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977). See also Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Bournazian, 342 So. 2d
471 (Fla. 1977). The rule against allowing insurance companies to set off awards serves to
protect the family exchequer.
79. 392 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc.
v. Gerzel, 397 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Mantilla v. Hassanien, 396 So. 2d
1135 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981). But see Selfe v. Smith, 397 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
80. 392 So. 2d at 258.
81. Id. at 259-60. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 262, n.11.
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The Ard court, bound by no earlier decisions and unpersuaded
by Orefice, has taken this step itself. To understand the impact of
Ard and the validity of the court's action it is helpful to reconsider
the policies which have traditionally been advanced for parental
immunity. They are, in broad terms, (1) preservation of domestic
tranquillity, (2) preservation of parental discipline and control, (3)
protection of the family exchequer, and (4) the danger of fraud and
collusion between parent and child.8
The notion that parental immunity preserves domestic harmony
and tranquillity has arisen from a faulty analogy to interspousal
immunity.8 4 The roots of interspousal immunity lie not in any soci-
etal concern for happy marriages but in the common law identity
of husband and wife and the husband's assumption of all his wife's
choses in action.85 Such identity has never existed between parent
and child,86 nor can any lofty desire to promote family peace be
defended logically in the face of the ability of a child to sue a par-
ent over property, contracts or wills.8 7 This rationale is particularly
weak in the fact situation of Ard. There is no dispute of the cir-
cumstances which caused the child's injuries; rather, the parent's
inability to compensate the child without recourse to her liability
insurance can only increase disharmony and tension. To para-
phrase Judge Liles,s8 it is hard to believe this mother purchased
insurance to protect all other children, but not her own.
The second policy concern, parental discipline and control,
would be unaffected by allowing recovery in the Ard case. Indeed,
there is some question as to whether it is a valid concern in any
case. It has been argued that allowing a parent to injure a child
with impunity might be more destructive of the trust and respect
upon which meaningful discipline and control are based.89
83. Berman, supra note 31, at 33-38. See also McCurdy, supra note 18, at 1072-77.
84. McCurdy, supra note 18, at 1074. The Ard court recognized this fault and draws a
more logically correct analogy to another judicially created immunity, that of municipalities,
which the Florida courts have modified as the policies underlying it have changed. 395 So.
2d at 588.
85. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 859.
86. Id. at 865.
87. Comment, supra note 29, at 187-88.
88. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
S9. Comment, supra note 29, at 190:
Query whether it is really sound public policy to put prospectively the stamp of
benign judicial approval on intentionally excessive punishment, willful neglect,
and the like by a parent, who by such conduct has placed serious doubt on the
desirability and wisdom of allowing him to exercise the normal parental functions
in the first place? It might be that the protection of the parental functions could
be just as effectively accomplished by scrutinizing the conduct of the parent on a
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The protection of the family exchequer is most clearly accom-
plished by allowing a child a cause of action under the facts of Ard.
The child has been injured; the resultant costs and disabilities
must be borne by the parents. Since Florida law in effect requires
all motorists to carry personal injury insurance,90 the child's com-
pensation would come from the insurance funds rather than from
those funds available for general family maintenance.'1 Although it
may be argued that liability insurance should never create liability
where none existed previously, such an argument distorts the na-
ture of parental immunity. The immunity does not destroy any pa-
rental duty toward offspring. Rather, it serves as a bar to prevent a
child from demanding compensation for any lapse of duty. Thus,
abrogation of the immunity does not create a new duty; it removes
a disability to sue by destroying the policy which justified the disa-
bility in the first place.'2 Any protection of the family exchequer is
weakened in a jurisdiction such as Florida which allows contribu-
tion from parents to third parties. The presence of liability insur-
ance was considered carefully in the decisions to allow such
contribution.9 3
Finally, the possibility of fraud or collusion between parent and
child admittedly is present. However, to allow this consideration to
bar all suits between parent and child, no matter how meritorious,
would imply a lack of faith in the entire judicial system.'4 Judges
and juries regularly weigh the credibility and significance of evi-
dence in suits of far greater complexity than the typical negligence
action. In interfamilial matters they would be aware of the in-
creased possibility of such collusion and would guard against it.
Furthermore, if a lawyer had knowledge of the collusion, he should
not bring suit. Lawyers are "officers of the court and practice pur-
suant to an oath against bringing such suits and a canon of ethics
which prohibits such action.' 95 In Ard the plaintiff was able to pre-
sent witnesses other than family members to testify to the circum-
case to case basis, applying normal tort concepts of reasonable care and recogniz-
ing parental privilege to apply reasonable sanctions, coupled with somewhat ex-
tended versions of the orthodox defenses of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence.
90. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1981).
91. Comment, supra note 46, at 801.
92. Comment, supra note 29, at 191.
93. See, e.g., Quest v. Joseph, 392 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Shor v. Paoli,
353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977); Berman, supra note 31, at 38. Perhaps the actuarial significance
of allowing such suits would increase premiums. Such an argument has not been persua-
sively urged in the case against familial contribution to third parties.
94. Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d at 142.
95. Vinci v. Gensler, 269 So. 2d 20, 21 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (Liles, J., dissenting).
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stances of the injury." To deny a cause of action in such a situa-
tion is to ignore reality for fear of a hypothetical.
The Florida Supreme Court has its first opportunity to address
in depth the doctrine of parental tort immunity and to reexamine
the policies underlying that immunity in light of changes in society
and in the law itself. The time has come to abolish this immunity
in Florida. As the court itself said in the context of abolishing mu-
nicipal immunity:
In doing this we are thoroughly cognizant that some may contend
that we are failing to remain blindly loyal to the doctrine of stare
decisis. However, we must recognize that the law is not static.
The great body of our laws is the product of progressive thinking
which attunes traditional concepts to the needs and demands of
changing times .... Judicial consistency loses its virtue when it
is degraded by the vice of injustice.9
VIRGINIA B. TowNs
96. 395 So. 2d at 587.
97. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957).
